Is it possible

jan 18, 2016 by

György Jakab:

 

Is it possible to write a common Hungarian-Slovakian history book?

The Myth of the common history book

 

After the millennium the issue of the common Hungarian-Slovakian history book has slowly become an evergreen topic. It is being raised over and over again in the professional and political life – only to sleep on the shelf of the „need-to-be-solve tasks of anytime” until the next alarm. On the recent months the debate of the possibility of the common Hungarian-Slovakian history book has been smartened again. The root cause was given by, that the German minister of education announced, he has initiated discussions with the educational leaders of the member states about writing a common European history book that serves the boost of the European identity.

 

It is clear, that in the – by the policy and media over discussed – debates of the recent years it hasn’t been raised essentially, what should be the actual genre of the Hungarian-Slovakian history book, history book-set. The common history book – it doesn’t matter, if it is a ministry presentation[1], the attitude of a bilateral historian joint-committee[2], Hungarian-Slovakian history teachers common program[3], press-analysis[4] – is existing essentially just as a task, that need to be solved. Mythical desire-fantasy, „intellectual or political balm”, that will once solve the conflicts and spite in the area. In the recent decades the consensus hasn’t been reached by the interested parties about what exactly should have been created – historian assays, guidebooks and further trainings for teachers, textbooks spread commonly in a wide range, bilateral social dialogues – towards the two countries real appeasement. Meanwhile certainly it is „being worked feverishly” on repairing the Hungarian-Slovakian dialogue in many different stages, but these effort are not linking in a common strategy, are not reaching the critical mass, that would cause real changes. It seems like this „active-not acting” would be under the interest-relation the basic of the consensus in both countries and between the two countries. Like neither the interest groups, nor the (education)political decision-makers have an interest in starting a long term action-strategy. The different ambitions – good or badly – are living peacefully next to each other[5]. Their tangible results (a few successful conferences, study-tome, meeting, etc.) are not get really publicity, and are not starting a „chain reaction” – and this is the natural status for everybody. On this the clarification of genre, which needs a wide consensus, is cancelled. That is why the case of the common history book actually stays as an unclear myth dropped in the actual conflicts.

 

National and transnational tradition

 

The other main decisive of the myth-formation is followed by the ideological kind of the national matter. Because in reference to ideological matter there are – at least – two kinds of ideological tradition both of countries: nation-centered (nationalist) and above the nations (transnationalist) approach. In the past one hundred-two hundred years obviously the previous is/was dominated both in the professional and public opinion. It is notorious[6], that the modern nation-centered history-attitude has been reached in every country on and to serve an ideological nation-building. Both the Slovakian and Hungarian states have been financing mainly the public history-education to create a unified historical mind and nation-state attitude in an ethnically and socially divided country. It is well-known too[7], that in the area of Middle-Europe, the neighbor-states – so the Hungarian and Slovakian as well – had developed their national history-attitude and nation-mind against each other mostly. This can be seen in their national mythologies, heroes and anthems as well[8]. But, of course, next to this, other ideological tendencies had been appeared – even if as a minority opinion. On the one hand, these opinions have been emphasizing the transnational connection of the area of Middle-Europe; on the other hand, they have been aiming the reconciliation, ’historical compromise’ of the neighbor nations. There are appreciated and significant representatives[9] of this school in the Hungarian public thinking – even if they have been charged in many cases by contemporaries and the posterity, mainly with unreality, philanthropy, antinationalist and lifeless moralization.

 

From the foregoing it is clear, that making any kind of a common Hungarian-Slovakian history book would mean a very controversial challenge. Because at least two kinds of ideological schools and historical approaches should been reconciled and mixed by the history book. And if we talk about a history book, than reconciling is not an overstatement. Traditionally, the situation of the history book and the history teachers is different from the historians. Basically, most of the historians have already gave up after scientific approach[10] of ’only valid’, ’one-way’ showing of the national past, and they are much more skeptic with the nation-centered history-approach. So, for the historians – especially for the society-historians – it is relatively a smaller problem to discuss the common post of Slovakia and Hungary. For the schools and the history teachers, it is an antagonistic problem at the first sight. So the public history education has been standing on the legitimate demand of the nation-state, and representing the nation-centered history-approach up to the present day. Namely: the basic social function of the history education in schools is transmit nation(state)-centered history-approach. Gábor Gyáni writes: in the framework of nation-states the citizenship education and making equivalent to member of the nation enjoys such a priority, that is not used to query… a school working this way fills ’national’ tasks. It is not socializing for a smaller community or subculture, but for the cultural code of today’s most universal community, the nation. And exactly that is, that „educates for life”. If the school does not fill this perfectly or just imperfectly, than it endangers the people, who move in it. These schools are not preparing the students for the necessary orientation and emergence in the community life. As long as the nation-state is the most (but no means the only) legitimate territory of life that every person can capture for her/himself, the school will never get loosed by the task of cultural homogenization. There is (with very little exceptions) only one native language, and the decisive percent of people have only one native (and historical too) culture. So it can be expected rightfully from the every healthy nation to integrate it’s members by a uniform code…[11]

 

So, the further approaches and interpretations can be said as very productive in the experimenting world of the science of history. But publishing the endless numbered alternative textbooks is not at all free of trouble: it endangers identity of people, the social dialogues and the cohesion. In the sense of this, a common Hungarian-Slovakian history book of the future – if it does not want to be perfectly uninterested for the people, who live here[12] – basically can not pass out of the range of the traditional nation-centered history-approach. But the other ideological tradition, the common regional sense and to decrease the hostility of these two nations is also a really important task for the people, who urge the common history book. The dissociation, the myth-creation and a bunch of appearance-activities are statutory from the first in the whole enterprise.

 

External and internal field

 

It makes the situation much more complicated, that – primarily due to the external political changes – the relationship of nationalist and transnationalist history-approach confused completely in this area in the past fifty years. The confusion comes from the transnationalist ideological expectations. These expectations „settled down” in many waves to the nationalist history- and society-approach of the people, who live here – and these expectations stand for different transnationalist approaches, like the socialist internationalism, the European identity, the globalization. These mostly forced external effects had mixed[13] in a peculiar way with the half-feudal relations being here. The main consequences had been the „shallow adjustment”, „pretended cooperation” both in Hungary and Slovakia. That is why the sense of reality became distorted, the mutual confidence, which is necessary for the cooperation, and the authentic communication undervalued. We have been replacing more and more the real situation-appraisal with myth of self-justification, and we have been maintaining the surface of change and development only with compensation.

 

Up to today we can feel those approach-distortations that were caused by the socialist-internationalist ideology in both countries[14]. This ideology had been „constructed” on the traditional nation-centered history-approach and public thinking. Naturally showing these items is not the part of our mission[15]. Therefore let us examine only the three „compulsory-Russian” consequences, which are important in this issue[16]:

  1. The most serious consequence of the forced internationalist ideology was that the organic shaping of the Hungarian nation-sense was interrupted for long decades. The social dialogues were strangled; the different aspects could not be brought to the surface: our traditional history-approach stiffened as the field of ideological resistance. And all these caused that the whole Hungarian history had been mystified for the public thinking. A historical event in its real complexity and in its social diversity could not been showed for the wider public without the charge of „betraying national interests”. That is how the revolution and the war of independence of 1848/49 became the emblem of national unity in the history books, that is how 15th of march became the symbol of the national togetherness and resistance (instead of the unfamiliar 7th of November) in the public thinking, that is how 1956 became the synonym „clean-hearted and clean-handed” national togetherness in private stories – continuing the earlier homogenize history-approach. So the mystification of our historical public thinking can be explained and defined by „external pressure”. In spite of this, we must also see, that the loss of our historical mind will cost us a serious price for a long time.[17]
  2. The other consequences of the internationalist ideology „settled on” our nation-centered history-approach are grave as well. Lies and half measures have became natural and legitim, norms have became relative. The history books have been flooded from necessity by „Marxist introductions”, „red tails” and east models of class struggle, but the alignment with the nation-centered history curriculum was not really good. And so – depending on the pressure from upper crust – a peculiar board game of people had born as „passive resistance”: half measures, „bilking” and „winking at each other”. This double game had been played directly by the political power in the second half of the era as well: „indicating to the left, going to the right” – whispered to the society. Inside the official called internationalist there was a serious legitimate function for appealing to the nation sense: „inside the camp we are the happiest shed”, „goulash-communism”, etc. This forced culture takeover will leave probably a serious mark for a long time in the public thinking of this area. Probably when we all forget everything about the proletarian internationalism, we will still know even after generations everything about how to „pretend”, do appearances, do act of compensations in cultural relations.
  3. From these problems it follows organically, that the attempts – just like the program of the common Hungarian-Slovakian history book – are fallen into discredit for a long a time. These attempts would modify the nation-centered history-approach and make peace between the national and transnational thinking. It became clear, that the internationalist ideology serves world-power politics, the openings and overtures of the local countries was oppressed strictly by the „big brother”, and the „brotherhood of peace-camp” proved to be empty, because the neighbor states closeted in their national traditions and oppressed cruelly the minorities, while the support was taboo for us. In this situation every honest overture like this was defeated.[18]

 

We hoped, that after the change of the political system and the secession of the soviet army the relationship of local countries gets better, the national question be less politicized, the ideological conflicts be loosened up. That is not really what had happened. After the fall of the Soviet Empire and the downfall of the state-socialist systems such a peculiar ideological vacuum has been evolved in our area that was filled up both in politically and ideologically with the available „materials” in this area: the nationalism that was oppressed and forced under the surface until this time. Becoming the state borders uncertain – a lot of new states were born in the area[19] –, the earlier and true or tended to be true harms emerged everywhere and the hostility between the ethnical communities and the need of identity defining against others became stronger[20]. In the fear of losing their power or the falling apart of their countries, the politicians „played the ethnical card” in many cases: to give rise to fear in their own people, to create enemy by their neighbors or minorities. Even more, from the beginning of the 90’s the people living here faced so much social or economical conflicts, that they was not be prepared and could not prepared (impoverishment, unemployment, the growing competition of the free market economy, etc.). The greater part of the people, who became uncertain, founded the new orientation point and the answers (xenophobia, looking for somebody to blame) to these conflicts necessarily in nationalism. Interconnected, the fear of the globalization and centralization of the European Union (the position of the „defenseless, poor, tolerated relative”) made the nationalism, the nation-centered thinking stronger in the countries of the area.

 

After the Millennium a new event turned out in the local area. Most of the countries – Hungary and Slovakia as well – became part of the European Union, that does not mean a traditional way of empire dependence, but still put transnational integration pressure on us. Before joining the EU it has been already defined several cultural and ideological expectations by the Union – the necessity of respecting human and minority rights, the claim of presentable settlement of ethnical (tribal) conflicts – that aimed at rethinking, modifying the traditional nation-centered approach. After joining we have had to face from time to time with the different thinking and acting models: the regional approach above ethnics, cooperative states leaving the historical conflicts behind, and efforts boosting the common European identity. Because of the contractual obligations and the fight for European development sources the countries of Middle-Europe – so Hungary and Slovakia as well – obviously have to conform to these external expectations. This means a serious challenge to the traditional nation-centered history and society approach. These changes bear very serious conflicts and contradictions and necessarily slow and delay the integration of the area. Those countries and people that suffered the earlier German and Russian colonization lived the period of their national independency and the recovery of their state sovereignty as a “historical justice”. However the long awaited western integration is naturally very desirable for the people living here, but this means the restraint of national sovereignty, the boundless spread of globalization as well. But all this turned to be too fast: the experience of the national sovereignty and the western integration and globalization has piled up. This dissociation became a decisive power in the political life of these two countries. Both the defense of the national values[21] and the joining of the European Union worked as a basic legitimization factor both in the left and right side.

 

It is not a coincidence, that proposal of German education minister Annette Schavan for a common European history book was received ambivalent, unenthusiastically or with rejection in the area. Of course, in the surface it is not presentable to reject such an idea, because there is no doubt for the philanthropic “good intention” – that is why everyone tried to dissociate faster and more spectacular from the Ján Slota’s statements. But we know very well[22] that under the surface age-long habits, feudal political models, strains and emotions oppressed under various dictatorships have worked, that can not be controlled by orders or compensate with “good intentional” campaigns. The nature and power of inner strains can be followed very well by a Slovakian survey, which searched the relationship of the ethnics living next to each other (Slovakians, Hungarians, romas, Ukrainians) after the development of the annual Slovakia. … there are many people under the Slovakians and Hungarians, who are sharing a positive opinion of their own group and negative opinion of the neighbor group. They are dissatisfied, very dissatisfied with the statement of their nationality, and they also have the willingness of solving the national question in an extremist radical way. Accordingly they can become a quickly mobilized tool in the hands of the political leadership, and coming in great number to various public meetings they can create mass psychosis. The greatest danger of an ethnical conflict explosion comes from the myth of the “lurker danger” and the myth of “national sufferings” in both nationalities. The attachment of these two myths to the rate of dissatisfaction and the type solution of the minority problem is the strongest. Under the survey the resource of the Hungarian-Slovakian internal conflict exists and there are many supplies for it. It contains deep historical roots, strong emotions and a peculiar social background. The existence of this potential must be counted with, but the importance of it must not be overrated. It is our duty to know about it and to “handle” it, in other case the overheated reality will cause a troublesome situation.[23]

 

The lessons of the French-German dialogue model

 

Another event has ruined the calm position of the common Hungarian-Slovakian history book in the recent years. After many-many antecedents, the common French-German history book[24] has been finished. And from that book real French and real German grammar school students – in their own language – learn about the history after 1945[25]. Interesting questions raised after this: how did they do it? What is the secret? What is that they know and we do not? What can we learn from them?

 

The secret is of course very simple and obvious: long-termed job that brought every interested parties in. Because this story began more than forty years ago, and it will take probably more decades, when the wide social effect will become ripen. It is clear, that the workflow was not always a successful serial and not a constant activity due to many interest-groups, many type of actors. In spite of this – and now it seems like much more – some kind of strategy, systematical plan or at least the purpose of a cooperation of the various interest-groups could have felt constantly. These things always have helped to move the case of the common history book forward. The basic intention and purpose was for the appeasement of the two countries[26] and people, the establishment of their common future and for the change in the approach that is necessarily to all these. Every interested knew that these purposes can only be realized with a steady starting point ( “mutual confessing and getting over the common past”). In this program not only the cooperation of the various leveled partners in the two countries was important, but to reconcile the different interests of a country’s politicians, historians, history-teachers, parents, student – so everyone.

 

The politicians – regardless of party affiliation – of the two countries, who constantly urged the case of the appeasement and cooperation of the two nations in the recent decades, based the symbolic fundament. French Prime Minister Charles De Gaulle and German chancellor Konrad Adenauer probably took the first step, when both of them were present at the memorial and mass held in the Cathedral of Reims. The interesting event about this was that the Germans in the First World War heavily damaged the Cathedral of Reims, the crowning church of the French kings. After this it was a great leap forward, when De Gaulle and Adenauer signed the Contract Elyseé in 1963 that confirmed the German-French friendship. This contract not only ended a hundred years old rivalry and hostility, but also founded the Europe’s economical and political unity. The German cartoonist Klaus Pielert delineated the conclusion of the contract as the wedding of Michel and Marianne, the German and French allegorical national figures. The organic continue of this cooperation was when German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and French Prime Minister Francois Mitterand in the common French-German soldier cemetery remembered hand in hand to front of the coffin covered with a symbolically half-German half-French flag. It was another confidence-building event, when French Head of State Jacques Chirac and German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder at the 60th anniversary of the amphibious landing in Normandy crowned with a wreath together. It is obvious, that we cannot overrate the role of the politicians in such a wide-ranged social historical course, but it is undoubted that these symbolical acts gave range and possibility for further active works.

 

Under the shade of political support the historians of the two countries – both separated and together – have done a serious job. Even before the recently discussed cooperation course the “easing”, subtle and differentiation of the obligate nation-centered history-approach. Fox example in the French history-writing significant historical schools had already been evolved between the two World Wars[27]. These schools existed next to the “uniform nation image” and the French “grande historie”, and they urged and used the comparative historical science, the regional and social historical approach. All this did not mean that the historians of the two nations would have ‘betrayed their nation”, or they would have given up the priority of the nation-centered history-approach. It truly meant that they have settled of with the part of the traditions of the 19th century historical science (the enact hero past, the transmit myth of the uniform nation image, the acceptance of the “tribal approach” of the universal national interests and justice) and have opened to the cooperation. Under these, the significant part of German and French historians – after decades of internal and common debates – became able to give a professional support to the making of a multi-aspect history book, and to an approach-forming teacher guide belonging to it. Opinion of German history book writer Rudolf von Thadden (history professor of the University of Göttingen) is worth to look at in this topic: Think of the mountain peak Mont Blanc: there is only one of it, but you can climb it from French or Italian side. That is how history work as well. In the Second World War the bombardment of Le Havre and Dresden is a fact, but for a French person the first one is much more destroying and suffering, unlike us, it is the other one. Napoleon took an undoubtedly important role in the European history, but in an other way for France and Germany. For France, he ended the revolution; in the eye of Germans he “exported” the mind of revolution to Europe. We have made an effort that both the German and French aspect of the events would be the part of the book. … There was virtually no scientific debate between the French and the German authors. Only the politicians validating the manuscript were the prisoners of the stereotypes. … For a surprise the authors had sometimes much more trouble with language, than the contents: even if they spoke both of languages fluently, some words were hard to translate. The French word ‘grandeur’ always bears a political meaning, unlike the German ‘Grosse’, which means intellectual greatness. French word ‘memoir’ refers to active memory; there is no German word for it. So they had to be historians as well as philologists at the same time! [28]

 

But the effective cooperation of politicians and historians would not be enough to the essential change in the approach of teaching history and to the wide introduction of the common history book. The renewal of history education in both countries connected directly to the efforts mentioned above[29]. In the third period of the last century it became clear for the French and German educational leaders that to learn and to teach the incredibly large (and as the time pasts even larger) history curriculum, which is compulsory for everyone, is not possible and not worth of in its completeness. After long debates and conciliations the system of the history curriculum had been modified gradually, carefully watching for filling further the essential integration function of this subject. All this means that the basic goals and function of history education is remained essentially – establishing the common historical sense and general culture, strengthening the identity, etc. – but they tried to realize this with less learning, and with more realistic methodology. Further these – mainly in Germany – they tried to focus on advancing general ability as well.

 

One of the essential change happened in contents. The number of issues and the rate of lexical knowledge have been radically decreased. They didn’t care about the extensive fullness of the earlier round; brave cuts have been taken from the compulsory curriculum, which naturally do not mean that the inquiring students could not learn even more historical knowledge in the school. The political history has been largely decreased, on the other hand many new social historical (the elements of the life style, the world of media) issue have been put in the new curriculum. The basic structure of the history education remained the chronological, but at some defined point – just like at operas under an aria – the story stops, and the students have the opportunity for a historical diving and searching. In these stations they have the opportunity for a thematically approach as well, that means they start from examining a recent social problem and searching its beginning. On the top of these dives lays the most important methodological novelty of the pedagogical system that also slowly becomes a Hungarian professional household term as “source-centered history education”. Because, in this pedagogical system the main target and requirement are now ability developer. Instead of teaching the chronological fullness, the main target here is to acquire the methodology of historical researching, exploring and analyzing under continuous practice. These means first of all source-analysis, text- and picture treatment, film-analyze, but the methodology contains text creating as well: the students also create ‘fake-historical’ text themselves analyzing specific historical situations. In this case the educating does not aim primarily to collect new cognitions, but to learn those professional methodologies and techniques that will let them later understand the new texts getting in front of them. So in this system the ‘good student’ is not the one who knows more about a historical issue, but the one who can reveal – under the wide accepted rules of source-analysis – new knowledge from various documents with the better efficiency[30]. The growing strength of the source-centered history education in both countries made it possible that in the lessons instead of unilateral ‘nation-centered declaration’ multilateral (French side – German side – and of course the Belgians) analyses come into existence, strengthening the multicultural approach. All these naturally not questioned the primacy of the nation-centered history-approach, just tinged the approaches. Of course it was necessarily to these to constantly provide the history teachers with background information and continual professional educations by the historians and history teachers working also directly on the French-German dialogues. At first they the history and social science books of the two nations were analyzed systematically and an ethical codex was written, by that the curriculums and textbooks were supervised. Then some so-called delicate issues of the common history – that were the most “sensitive” in the course of the appointments – were heightened and deep multilateral analyses, modules, projects were created to the discussions. The first tangible results were appeared as the exact translation of the locations and names, then the multilateral text-processing, modules, projects and common teacher-qualifications from sides were came up next. Meanwhile of course many formal, institutional frameworks were constructed. The most important framework was textbook comparative analyzer Georg Ecker Institut.

 

Accordingly the born of the common German-French history book has many components. In the recent decades – and probably in the further as well – the most important question was how the public opinion can be won over to the further cooperation. Namely the history mostly does not (only) mean scientific knowledge and approaches for the public opinion, but the base of national identity, the national togetherness and citizenship loyalty. So the actual shaping of the social and national mind needs and needed a much wider social dialogues. For the actual changes in social approach and for further cooperation new and new “civil society proposals” – student exchange programs, intensive language learning, “invasion” of the tourists, etc. etc. – are necessarily.

 

[1] www.okm.gov.hu/letolt/kozokt/okb/okb_06921.pdf

[2] www.has-sas-office.mtaki.hu/020925_26_leveltar_ma.pdf

[3] http://www.tte.hu/index.php?page=hirmondo&id=47

[4] index.hu/tech/tortenelem/szlovzuet272/ – 37k –

 

[5] For who are familiar with this issue these phrasing are known …now we really begin, we are working on it, we haste it… we do everything, but the other partner… we are to small in ourselves… we promised, but unfortunately we can not assist for further programs

[6] some titles in the topic of modern age nationalism: Anthony D. Smith: A nacionalizmus. In. Eszmék: a politikában: nacionalizmus (Szerk. Bretter Zoltán és deák Ágnes. Pécs. Tanulmány Kiadó. 1995.; Anthony D. Smith: A nacoionalizmus és a történészek. = www.adatbank.transindex.ro/html/cim_pdf650.pdf.; Ernest Gellner: A szabadság feltételei – A civil társadalom és vetélytársai. Typotex Elektronikus Kiadó* – 2004.; Eric J. Hobsbawm): A nacionalizmus kétszáz éve. Budapest: Meacenas Kiadó 1999.; Gerő András: Képzelt történelem. PolgART Könyvkiadó. Budapest, 2004.

[7] Ács Zoltán: Zoltán  Nemzetiségek a történelmi Magyarországon .Bp.: Kossuth, 1986. Bibó István: Kelet-európai kisállamok Nyomorúsága, in. Bibó István: válogatott tanulmányok, Magvető Könyvkiadó. Budapest 1986. II. kötet. 185-266. p. Jászi Oszkár: A nemzeti államok kialakulása és a nemzetiségi kérdés : Válogatás / Jászi Oszkár ; bev., vál. és jegyzetekkel ell. Litván György. – [Röv. kiad.]. -Bp. : Gondolat, 1986. .;Romsics Ignác: Nemzet, nemzetiség és állam Kelet-Közép-és Délkelet Európában a 19. és 20. században. Napvilág kiadó Budapest. 1998.

[8] Kiss Gy. Csaba: A haza, mint kert. Nap Kiadó, Budapest, 2005.

[9] Let us think on the example of Szemere Bertalan, Teleki László, a kései Kossúth Lajos, Mocsáry Lajos, Jászi Oszkár, Bibó István és követőik, illetve Ady Endre, Németh László, József Attila, Bartók Béla and others

[10] For more see: Gyáni Gábor: Posztmodern kánon. Nemzeti Tankönyvkiadó Bp. 2002.; Gyáni Gábor: Emlékezés, emlékezet és a történelem elbeszélése. Napvilág Kiadó. Bp. 2000. ;Romsics Gergely: Mítosz és emlékezet. L’Harmattan Kiadó Bp. 2004.

[11] Gyáni, Gábor: Mit várhat az iskola a szkeptikus történetírástól? = Új Pedagógiai Szemle. 1997/4. 96. o.

[12] it is possible of course to imagine a regional, „transnational” history book written by an objective historian from Middle-Africa, that shows the Hungarian-Slovakian common past as a tribal development, or focuses only to the society history. But it is clear, that nor in Slovakia and in Hungary that book would not be successful, but would not even help the solution of the conflicts really.

[13] The sociological literature calls creolazation or hybridizing the connection of smaller or larger cultures, where many forms of correlation can exist. More: Zárva várt nyugat (szerk Kovács János Mátyás) 2000/Sík kiadó. Budapest, 2002. 487-497. o.

[14] The Slovakians had the face with the “shadow” of the Czech as well

[15] Instructive in this issue: Szilágyi, Ákos: Két globalizáció Magyarországon. I.n. A zárva várt nyugat. U.o. . 27-65. p.

[16] Without more knowledge here we can undertake to show only the Hungarian situation

[17] It is enough to refer to the recent social storms – we can not celebrate 15th of march or 1956 – that caused by the decay of these myth and that causes serious identity crisis and disorganization in the Hungarian society.

[18] Let us think on crash of the incredibly brave “handshake” of film director András Kovács and writer Tibor Cseres, when they made a film and write a book about the Hungarian war crimes committed in the World War Two, but there were no similar gesture from the Serbian side.

[19] Slovakia also in 1993.

[20] Especially the fall of Yugoslavia was dramatic, where the strong nationalism had leaded to a brutal war, systematical “ethnical clean up”.

[21] Let us think on the regional grim battle that was for defending the so-called hungaricums – tokaji, palinka – at the Millenium

[22] Good inter-ethnical sociological surveys in this issue: Csepeli, György-Örkény, Antal-Székelyi, Mária: Nemzetek egymás tükrében. Interetnikus viszonyok a Kárpát-medencében. Balassi kiadó. Budapest. 2002. 180. p.; Örkény, Antal –Szabó, Ildikó: Tizenévesek állampolgári kultúrája. Minoritás Könyvek, Budapest 1998.; Szabó, Ildikó: A pártállam gyermekei. Tanulmányok a magyar politikai szocializációról. Budapest, Új Mandátum Kiadó 2000.; Nemzetek jelleme és a nemzeti sztereotípiák.In. Mindentudás Egyeteme 4., (szerk. Hitseker, Mária Szilágyi, Zsuzsa) Budapest, -:Kossuth Könyvkiadó, 2005.

[23] The summary of the survey publicated in: Bordás Sándor – Huncik Péter: Barát és ellenségkép változatok Kisebbségpolitikai döntés-előkészítő tanulmányok. Sorozat (DET) 17. számú füzet. Budapest. 1999. 10-11. o.

[24] Histoire/Geschichte – Europa und die Welt seit 1945. Ernst Klett Schulbuchverlag. Leipzig 2006.
Histoire/Geschichte – L’Europe et le monde depuis 1945. Éditions Nathan, Paris. 2006.

[25] For the introduction of the two-sided textbook see: Közösen értelmezik a francia-német múltat – 2006. október 3. = http://www.mult-kor.hu/nyomtatas.php?article=14995

[26] The situation is obviously more complicated, because during the significant part of cooperation process there were two states that were in the opposite side both in political and ideological way. In the cooperation with the French logically West-German participated, but later, after the German reunion it became the heritage of the united Germany

[27] The most known is the historian of the historical journal Annales

[28] Inotai, Edit: História a Rajna két oldaláról írva. Népszabadság. 2006. május 27. .

http://nol.hu/voks/cikk/405365/

[29] Naturally the educational reforms introduced in the past few decades are different in many ways both structurally and methodologically. Here we are emphasizing only the most important orientations and similar tendencies.

[30] From these methodological and .. changes the history book itself gives a good match, and F. Dárdai Ágnes: Az összehasonlító tankönyvkutatás nemzetközi tapasztalatai. = Edcatio 2000/4(ősz)498-508

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